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Abstract
This paper explores how loan collateral affects the problem of moral hazard between
banks and a deposit insurance agent. First, when the collateral value is certain, it
attenuates the volatility of bank returns, thereby making banks more safe and mitigating
moral hazard. Here, the paper presents three simple models, in which the collateral value
fluctuates and fuels moral hazard. The latter findings are broadly consistent with the
characteristics of the topical subprime mortgage crisis.
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1. Introduction
In the U.S.A numerous subprime banks are presently failing. Subprime banking represents a novel
and rapidly growing segment of the mortgage market that channels loans to those borrowers, who
fail to meet credit quality requirements in the standard mortgage market. This paper poses the
question of whether banks, for example subprime banks, gamble with the value of collateral (real
estate). Borrowers of the subprime banks are risky clients but their loans are secured by house
property. Even when a borrower cannot earn sufficient income to repay the loan, the bank does not
face a loan loss if the value of house property appreciates during the loan period. Thus, the bank
makes handsome profits if the collateral value appreciates. If the value of the real estate depreciates,
the bank fails because a large share of the borrowers is unable to repay their loans and the value of
the collateral does not cover loan repayments. Consequently, the banks are de facto gambling with
the upcoming value of real estate.1
According to the classic banking theory, collateral reduces bank risk. Even when a
borrower has insufficient income to repay his loan, a bank can seize the collateral (Bester, 1985;
1987). This traditional argument has been brought fore in several articles. For brevity, we mention
only one example:
“The value of a bank’s assets is most likely to fall if borrowers default on their loans or changes in asset prices
generate falls in the value of their marketable investments. In both cases, banks can reduce the risks they face by
appropriate pricing and screening of transactions, diversifying their asset portfolio or taking collateral (Bell &
Pain, 2000, p.113).”
This paper does not deny that collateral reduces bank risk. Rather, the accuracy of the argument is
investigated and confirmed in Section 4. Since the value of collateral is certain, it attenuates the
volatility of bank income and thereby creates two positive impacts. First, collateral may prevent
bank failures and make banks risk-free. Second, it may eliminate the moral hazard problem. That is,
the bank will not take excessive risks in lending.
1 For subprime lending see Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross (2006). Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross find
that the subprime premium, the difference between the prime and subprime rates, charged to a subprime borrower is
around 2 percentage points. This makes subprime loans attractive to banks. However, evidence indicates that on average
the probability of default is at least six times higher for nonprime loans than for prime loans.
1The positive effects of collateral are challenged in Sections 4-6. The sections put
forward three models, in which the introduction of collateral generates the moral hazard problem. In
each model, the collateral value fluctuates. In Section 4, bank returns are certain without collateral
and the moral hazard problem is avoided. Thereafter, collateral is introduced. Its upcoming value is
uncertain, which tempts banks to gamble with the collateral. Banks refrain from costly efforts in
borrower evaluation, but lending decisions are based on the collateral. If the collateral value is high
at the later date, the bank makes a profit. If the collateral value depreciates, the bank fails and the
bank regulator, who runs the deposit insurance scheme, pays the costs of excessive risk taking.
Section 5 extends the analysis by demonstrating that the negative effects of collateral are severe if
the upcoming value of collateral is closely correlated with the upcoming probability of project
success. Section 6 models the example of a subprime bank. The moral hazard effect is shown to be
strengthen when outside collateral is replaced with inside collateral, which is funded with the loan
capital.
The paper is related to recent research on moral hazard in banking: e.g. Matutes &
Vives (1996, 2000), Blum (1999, 2002), Chiesa (2001), Niinimäki (2001), Repullo (2004),
Decamps & Rochet & Roger (2004), Jeitschko & Jeung (2005) and Kopecky & VanHoose (2006).
When Bester (1985, 1987) investigates how collateral affects the risk of a single loan, the question
to be answered is: how does collateral influence on bank risk at the aggregate level. Does collateral
alleviate or worsen the bank’s risk of failure? We are primary interested in investigating the
scenarios, if any, in which collateral can fuel moral hazard in banking. As mentioned above, we are
able to observe these scenarios. Our findings are rather consistent with existing empirical evidence
which is surveyed in Section 2. Put differently, the purpose of this paper is to design simple models
on loan markets that are based on a few stylized facts given in Section 2 and that can reproduce a
few results consistent with the evidence of Section 2. Based on empirical evidence, it is known that
banking crises are closely linked to fluctuations in the value of real estate. The paper proposes a
theory which explains why banking crisis are connected with fluctuations in real estate markets.
Section 2 reviews empirical evidence and Section 3 presents the model framework.
Section 4 examines how collateral mitigates moral hazard. Sections 5, 6 and 7 present three
examples in which collateral may fuel moral hazard, and Section 8 concludes.
22. Empirical evidence
This section surveys the empirical evidence on collateral, fluctuations in real estate markets and the
relationship between collateral value and banking crises.
Observation 1. The ratio of collateral to loan size is high. According to Binks et al.
(1993) and de Meza & Southey (1996), in the U.S.A the ratio of collateral to loan is, on average, 1:2
and in the Great Britain exceeds unity for 85% of loans. In the study by Gonas & Highfield &
Mullineux (2004), 73% of loans for US firms are secured.
Observation 2. A major portion of collateral consists of real estate. According to
Borio’s (1996) observations, the portion of loans secured by real estate collateral varies in different
countries: 59% in Great Britain, 56% in Canada and 66% in United States.
Observation 3. Collateral value, most of all the value of real estate, fluctuates
substantially. In Stockholm, for example, inflation-adjusted property prices rose rapidly in the late
1980s, rising to 450% of the level at the beginning of the decade. From 1989 to 1993, inflation-
adjusted property prices depreciated to less than the 1982 level (Herring & Wachter, 1999). US
farmland prices appreciated sharply from 1972, peaking in 1981 to more than twice the 1972 level.
From 1981 to 1998, prices reverted to the original level (Herring & Wachter, 1999). In Japan,
commercial property prices rose over 300% during the 1980s despite a very modest inflation rate in
consumer prices, but declined again to the initial level over the next five years (Hilbers & Lei &
Zacho, 2001). Using non-performing commercial real estate loans held by FDIC receiverships,
Freund & Seelig (1993) investigate changes in the value of collateral on loan-by-loan basis.
Average depreciation in collateral value was 54%. In three-quarters of the loans, the 1992 collateral
value was at least 25% below the original evaluation.
Observation 4. Banking crises are commonly preceded by a depreciation in the value
of real estate. Herring and Wachter (1999, p. 2), for instance, document the following:
“One striking feature of the current Asian financial crisis is that the most seriously affected countries first
experienced a collapse in property prices and a consequent weakening of their banking systems before an exchange
rate crisis.”
In their empirical research, Hilberts & Lei & Zacho (2001) find that on average, real estate prices,
adjusted for inflation rose more than 20% within 2 to 7 years before the onset of financial distress
but fell more than 15% during the two years prior to the beginning of financial distress. After the
onset of financial crises, real estate prices often continued to fall.  Zhu’s (2003) empirical study
3focuses on the level of banking profitability and loan loss provisions during the upswing and
downward phases of real estate markets. On average, bank profits are almost halved, and loan loss
provisions nearly doubled when the value of real estate depreciates. In the FDIC ’s extensive
empirical analysis on the Savings and Loan Crisis, Hanc (1998. p. 19-24) offers the following
conclusions regarding four major regional and sectoral recessions that were associated with
widespread bank failures: “Commercial and real estate markets in particular deserve attention
because boom and bust activity in these markets was one of the main causes of losses at both failed
and surviving banks.” For more evidence, see Allen & Madura & Wiant (1995).
Observation 5. Collateral value is correlated with the cycles of the economy. In their
cross-country empirical analysis based on a sample of 17 developed economies, Davis & Zhu
(2004) find that GDP has an important impact on commercial property prices. Their findings are
supported by Abraham & Hendershott (1996), who discover that real income growth has a positive
effect on real house prices. According to Jacobsen & Naug (2005), household income raises house
prices, while unemployment reduces them in Norway. For more evidence, see Lamont & Stein
(1999).
43. Economy
The paper includes four models for investigating how collateral affects bank risk. Although the
models are separate, they have a few common characteristics, which are presented now.
Consider a risk-neutral economy with banks, borrowers (= entrepreneurs ) and a bank
regulator.2 Each entrepreneur can undertake an investment project, which requires a unit of input
capital. Since the entrepreneur has no capital of his own, he needs to seek financing from a bank.
Bank size is 1 and it has no capital of its own. The bank funds its lending by attracting deposits at
the interest rate of the economy, r . The deposits are insured by the bank regulator. As is common
in this type of model, it is assumed that the regulator cannot directly observe the project risks and
loan interest rates. However, the regulator can impose a ruling that banks to grant only
collateralized loans.
An entrepreneur can choose from two project types: a good project or a bad project.
When successful, the good project produces GY  units. Its expected probability of success is Gm  and
its NPV (net present value) is assumed to be clearly positive,
mrYGG +>m . (3.1)
The expected project output covers the interest payment and the cost of monitoring, m . When
successful, the bad project produces BY  units. Its expected probability of success is Bm  and its NPV
is assumed to be negative,
rYBB <m . (3.2)
If unsuccessful, both project types yield no output. As is usual in risk-shifting models, the bad
project is assumed to be risky in comparison with the good project. Its expected probability of
success is low, GB mm < , but when it succeeds, the output is large, GB YY > .
2 We assume that a bank manager who monitors the borrowers also owns the bank. Jeitschko & Jeung (2005)
investigate risk taking in the case that the bank is owned by shareholders, but the bank manager makes the loan
decisions. They observe three optimal risk levels: the manager’s most-preferred asset risk, the shareholders’ most-
preferred asset risk and the optimal risk choice of the deposit insurer.
5Suppose that a bank grants a loan to the entrepreneur at the interest rate of the
economy, r . In the absence of monitoring, the risk-shifting problem is assumed to surface. The
entrepreneur chooses the bad project since it is expected to yield higher profits to him
)()( rYrY BBGG -<- mm . (3.3)
The risk-shifting problem can be eliminated by monitoring the entrepreneur. The task is delegated
to the bank, which monitors borrowers on the behalf of depositors. Unfortunately, since monitoring
incurs a non-monetary cost, m , to the banker, there is a temptation to neglect it. This generates the
problem of moral hazard between the bank and the bank regulator. When the bank neglects
monitoring, it may earn handsome returns because it has forgone the costs of monitoring.
Alternatively, the bank fails. The banker does not lose anything since the bank regulator, who is a
deposit insurance agent, repays the depositors. The banker will exert efforts to monitoring only if it
is at least as profitable to the bank as neglecting monitoring.
For brevity, several assumptions are made when the problem of moral hazard is
constructed. For example, the model is mainly constructed so that a monitoring bank is risk-free.3
Thus, under monitoring the deposit insurance premium is zero.4 In addition, with monitoring the
bank makes zero profits because of perfect competition. This makes it easy to examine moral
hazard. The bank neglects monitoring if the non-monitoring strategy yields any profits for it.
3 In Section 4, a monitoring bank is risk-free if the loans are secured with collateral.
4 The deposits are insured, for example, in order to eliminate bank runs (Diamond & Dybvib, 1983; Niinimäki, 2003).
64. Uncertain loan losses, certain collateral
In this section the value of collateral is certain, whereas the upcoming share of successful loans is
uncertain. The analysis shows that in this environment the introduction of collateral is beneficial
since it mitigates moral hazard and may make banking risk-free with monitoring.
To begin with, the model framework needs to be detailed. The upcoming share of
successful loans (vice versa loan losses) depends on the upcoming state of the economy (e.g. boom
or recession), which is unknown at the beginning of period, when banks grant loans and
entrepreneurs invest the loan capital in their projects. With probability b , the economy later booms
and with probability b-1  a recession takes place.
Suppose, first, that a bank monitors. If the economy booms, a project (and a loan)
succeeds with probability Gn . With a recession, the project succeeds with probability Gn  , GG nn < .
The expected probability to succeed is
GGG nbnb )1( -+=m  . (4.1)
As regards to the bank’s loan portfolio, the upcoming share of successful loans is Gn  within a boom
period and Gn  in a recession, whereas the expected share of successful loans is Gm .
In the absence of monitoring, a project succeeds with probability Bn  under a boom
and with probability Bn  in a recession, BB nn < . It is assumed that
GBGB nnnn ££ , .                       (4.2)
In the loan portfolio, the share of successful loans is Bn  during a boom and Bn  in a recession,
whereas the expected share of successful projects is
BBB nbnb )1( -+=m .  (4.3)
It is assumed that a defaulted loan cannot be more valuable to the bank than a performing loan:
7Assumption 1. The bank’s income from collateral is, at a maximum, equivalent to the loan
repayment.
We will first investigate bank returns under monitoring and thereafter in the absence of monitoring.
4.1 Under monitoring
Several alternative collateral–interest rate combinations exist which yield the same profits to a
borrower. Suppose that the borrower has a fixed amount, C  units, outside collateral. A break-even
loan interest rate, GR ,  can be solved from
.)1( mrCR GGG +=-+ mm (4.4)
The expected loan repayments to the bank, GG Rm , and expected collateral proceeds from
unsuccessful projects, CG )1( m-  together cover the costs of banking: interest payments on deposits
and the non-monetary costs of monitoring, mr + . The break-even loan interest rate is
G
G
G
CrmCR
m
m )1()( --+= , (4.5)
and it is declining in collateral; the borrower is ready to pledge collateral only if this alternative
offers him a reduction in the interest rate. If rmC += , we see that CRG =  and the loan is fully
collateralized. The borrower’s expected profits from the good project are CRY GGGG )1()( mm ---  .
When the project succeeds, the borrower obtains the output and can repay the loan. When the
project fails, the borrower loses the collateral. Given (4.5), the expected profits from the good
project are
0>--= mrYGGG mp . (4.6)
Only now, when the loan interest rate is defined, the following assumption can be made.
Assumption 2. rRn GG <)0( .
8Assumption 2 details the benefits from collateral. A monitoring bank fails when the upcoming share
of successful loans is small if the loans are not secured with collateral.
As for the bank returns, two cases arise, depending on whether the upcoming share of
successful loans is large or small. When it is large, Gn , the bank earns +)(CRn GG rCnG -- )1( .
Inserting the loan interest rate from (4.5) into this equation gives the restated bank returns
G
GGGG Cnrrmn
m
mm )()( ---+
. (4.7)
Since GGn m>  bank returns are decreasing in collateral and they are at least m .
When the realized share of successful loans is small, Gn ,  the bank returns are
G
GGGG Cnrrmn
m
mm )()( -+-+
. (4.8)
Recall that the bank fails without collateral, rrmn GG m<+ )(  (Assumption 2). Now, according to
(4.8), collateral increases bank returns since GG n>m . If C  is sufficiently large, the bank does not
fail even when the realized share of successful loans is small. This is easy to verify by inserting
mrC +=  into (4.8). Collateral makes the bank risk-free by increasing its returns during a recession,
since even the unsuccessful loans yield some income (collateral) to the bank.
Intuitively, collateral attenuates the volatility of bank returns in two ways. First, it cuts
the loan interest rate, thus decreasing bank returns from successful loans. Second, it increases the
returns from unsuccessful loans. Due to the introduction of collateral, bank returns decrease during
an economic boom when the share of successful loans is large (recall (4.7)). In contrast, bank
returns increase during a recession when the share of successful loans is small (see (4.8)).
4.2 In the absence of monitoring
Suppose that the bank suggests the non-monitoring strategy to the borrower. Instead of monitoring
and forcing the borrower to select the good project, the bank agrees to neglect monitoring so that
9the borrower can choose the bad project. The borrower accepts the offer if his expected profits from
the bad project are at least equal to those from the good project
GBBBB CCRY pmm ³--- )1())(( . (4.9)
From which it is easy to solve the highest loan interest rate that is acceptable to the borrower
B
GBBB
B
CYCR
m
pmm ---
=
)1(
)( . (4.10)
Only now, when the loan interest rate is defined, the following assumption can be made
Assumption 3. rRn BB >)0( .
Assumption 3 is not essential, but it highlights the benefits from collateral. A non-monitoring bank
can repay the depositors in an economic boom, that is, when a large share of loans is successful.
Expected bank returns are now explored. Suppose first that the upcoming share of
successful loans is large so that the bank earns returns +BB Rn rCn B -- )1( . Given the loan
interest rate (4.10), the bank returns can be restated
B
BBGBBBB rCnnrYn
m
mpm ))(()( -----
. (4.11)
Without collateral, the bank returns are positive (Assumption 3). The problem of moral hazard may
appear: the bank optimally neglects monitoring. It is, however, easy to see from (4.11) that the
returns from the non-monitoring strategy are decreasing in collateral. If the amount of collateral is
large, for example BRC = , the bank returns, rCnRn BBB --+ )1( ,  simplify to rRB - . Yet, from
(4.10) it is possible to see that rRB <   when BRC =  and thus the bank fails. Suppose now that the
upcoming share of successful loans is small. When BRC = , the bank returns , +BB Rn
rCn B -- )1( , again simplify to rRB - , and the bank fails, since rRB <   when BRC =  (see
(4.10) ). Hence, when the amount of collateral is sufficiently large the non-monitoring strategy is
unprofitable whatever the share of successful loans, and thus the bank optimally monitors.
10
The intuition is the same as in Section 4.1. Collateral attenuates the volatility of bank
returns by cutting the loan interest rate and thereby decreasing bank returns when the share of
successful loans is large. The attenuation of volatility leads to the elimination of moral hazard since
gambling is on average unprofitable, rYBB <m . Gambling is profitable only if the volatility of bank
returns is sufficiently large. Put differently, when the collateral requirement is sufficiently large,
entrepreneurs are willing to borrow only if the loan interest rate is lower than the deposit interest
rate. This makes banking unprofitable.
Suppose that the bank sets such a collateral requirement that makes it risk-free under
monitoring (Section 4.1). Does this amount of collateral eliminate moral hazard? It is easy to give a
counter example. Consider the following economy: 8.0,9.0 == GG nn , ,9.0=Bn
,6.0=Bn ,4.1,3.1 == BG YY 4.0,02.1,03.0 === brm . The values provide ,72.0=Bm
042.0,84.0 == GG pm . Using (4.8), it is possible to verify that when 42.0=C , a monitoring bank
is risk-free. Suppose that the bank regulator imposes collateral requirement 42.0=C . Under
monitoring, the bank is now risk-free, but it earns zero profits. It is easy to see from (4.11) that by
neglecting monitoring the bank enjoys positive returns. Thus, when 42.0=C , the bank optimally
neglects monitoring. Now (4.11) reveals that if the bank regulator implies collateral requirement
75.0=C  the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable. The bank optimally monitors and is risk-free.
Proposition 1. When the upcoming share of successful loans is uncertain, but the value of
collateral is certain, collateral attenuates the volatility of bank returns and thereby creates two
positive effects.  First, it increases expected returns from monitoring during a recession, thus
preventing a bank failure. Second, it decreases the returns from the non-monitoring strategy during
a boom, making the non-monitoring strategy unprofitable.
Consequently, the bank regulator should require banks to grant loans only against collateral.5
5 Alternative methods exist for mitigating moral hazard in banking: e.g.  ceilings on interest rates (Matutes & Vives,
2000; Repullo, 2004), risk-based deposit insurance premiums (Matutes & Vives, 2000), subordinated bank debt (Blum,
2002; Decamps & Rochet & Roger, 2004), franchise value (Chiesa, 2001; Repullo, 2004) and bank equity capital
(Rochet, 1992; Blum, 1999; Chiesa, 2001; Niinimäki, 2001; Repullo, 2004; Kopecky & VanHoose, 2004, 2006;
Decamps & Rochet & Roger, 2004; Jeitschko & Jeung, 2005).
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5. Certain loan losses, uncertain collateral
In this section the upcoming share of successful loans is certain, but the upcoming value of
collateral fluctuates. The section examinates how the introduction of collateral may generate the
moral hazard problem when banks can gamble with the fluctuating value of collateral.
To begin with, the model setting is updated. Under monitoring, a loan succeeds with
certain probability Gm  while in the absence of monitoring it succeeds with certain probability Bm .
In the bank’s loan portfolio, the share of successful loans is equal to its expected value: Bm  in the
absence of monitoring and Gm  under monitoring. The upcoming value of collateral is uncertain. To
keep the analysis simple, the collateral value is modelled in an elementary way. With probability h
it is high, Ca , and with probability h-1  it is low, Ca , aa <<£ 10 . The current value of
collateral is equal to its expected value
[ ]ChhC aa )1( -+= . (5.1)
For brevity, the following assumption is made
Assumption 4. .0)1()1( >--- am Cm G
Assumption 4 implies that under monitoring, bank returns can cover payments on deposits and the
bank is risk-free. The moral hazard problem is assumed to appear without monitoring in both cases
rC >a and rC <a . That is, without monitoring, a borrower chooses the bad project
[ ] [ ]rCMaxhrYrChMaxrY BBBGGG --+-<--+- ammamm ,0)1()(,0)1()( .   (5.2)
Since the collateral value can appreciate, it may exceed r  and the borrower has wealth, rC -a ,
even when his project fails.
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5.1 Under monitoring
Note that without collateral, the borrower’s expected returns are 0>--= mrYGGG mp . He accepts
such loan interest rate / collateral combinations, which satisfy his participation constraint
GGGGG CRY pmm =--- )1()( ,
from which it is easy to solve the loan interest rate
G
G
G
CmrCR
m
m )1(
)(
--+
= .   (5.3)
Since a certain share of loans succeeds, the bank returns are 0)1( >--+ rCR GGG amm , when the
upcoming value of collateral is high and 0)1( >--+ rCR GGG amm , when it is low. Thanks to
Assumption 4, the bank can pay back deposits in both cases. More importantly, the bank is now
risk-free without collateral since 0)0( >=- mrRGGm .
5.2 In the absence of monitoring
The bank neglects monitoring and borrowers can invest in the bad projects. The loan interest rate /
collateral combinations need to satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint
GBBBBBB RCMaxhCRY pammm =--+--- ),0()1()1()( . (5.4)
Two cases occur, depending on whether BRC <a  or BRC >a .
5.2.1 The case BRC <a
In this section it is assumed that BRC <a  (more precisely, [ ] CCY BBGBB mmpma )1( ---<  ).
The loan interest rate can be solved from (5.4) as
13
B
BGBB
B
CYCR
m
mpm )1(
)(
---
=  . (5.5)
Without collateral, bank returns are certain and negative 0)0( <--=- rYrR GBBBB pmm  , given
(3.2). The non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable, the moral hazard problem is avoided and the
bank optimally monitors! With collateral, the expected bank returns are
[ ] [ ]0,)1()1(0,)1( rCRMaxhrCRMaxh BBBBBB --+-+--+ ammamm . (5.6)
Inserting loan interest rate from (5.5) into (5.6) gives
[ ]
[ ]0,)1)(1()1(
0,)1)(1(
CrYMaxh
CrYMaxh
BGBB
BGBB
ampm
ampm
------
+--+--
(5.7)
In the second set of brackets (the collateral value is low) the first term is negative since rYBB <m .
In the first set of brackets (the collateral value is high) the first term is positive if CB )1)(1( -- am  is
sufficiently large.  This is true if the initial amount of collateral, C , is relatively high and if the
collateral value appreciates; that is, a  is great. Then, the bank earns profit
CrY BGBB )1)(1( --+-- ampm , (5.8)
which is, of course, increasing in C  and a . Since the variance of the collateral is increasing in a
(Appendix A), the expected bank returns are high when the collateral value fluctuates widely.  Yet,
the constraint )(CRC B<a also needs be satisfied. It can be written as
C
CY
B
GBB
m
pm
a
--
+< 1 . (5.9)
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Since we must have 1>a  , this determines restrictions also on C . This problem is discussed in
Remark 1 below. Footnote 5 gives a numeric example, which satisfies the constraints.6
Proposition 2. When the upcoming share of successful loans is certain, but the upcoming value of
collateral is uncertain, the introduction of collateral may generate the moral hazard problem. The
larger the volatility of the upcoming value of collateral, the worse the moral hazard problem.
Moral hazard appears when the initial value of collateral, C,  is relatively high. A banking crisis
occurs when the collateral value depreciates. This is consistent with Observation 4 in Section 2.
5.2.2 The case BRC >a
Now BRC >a or more precisely [ ] CCY BBGBB mmpma )1( ---> . The loan interest rate can
again be solved from (5.4)
h
ChYCR
BB
BGBB
B )1(
)1)(1(
)(
mm
ampm
-+
----
= . (5.10)
The constraint BRC >a means that
hCC
hCCY
BB
BGBB
)1(
)1()1(
1
mm
ampm
a
-+
--+--
+> . (5.11)
Since BRC >a  a loan is repaid when the project succeeds or when the collateral value appreciates.
Thus, the bank returns are
6 Suppose that ,01.0,03.1,05.1,1 ==== mrYGGm ,,8.0,25.1 21=== hY BB m 7.0,7.0,3.1 === Caa .
Under these values, .0625.1,04.1 == BG RR  When the collateral value appreciates, it is less than the loan repayment
since =3.1*7.0 0625.191.0 < . As a result, the bank receives the whole collateral, 91.0 , when the project is
unsuccessful. Since 80% of bank loans succeed, it earns profits, +0625.1*8.0 002.003.191.0*2.0 =- . Hence, the
bank optimally neglects monitoring.
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[ ] [ ]0,)1()1(0, rCRMaxhrRMaxh BBBB --+-+- amm . (5.12)
The term in the second set of brackets is 0 (Appendix B). In the first brackets, the term is positive if
rRB > . From (5.10) it is possible to observe that this is true if
[ ] .0)()1()( >------ rChCrY BGBB ampm (5.13)
Since the first term is positive (this is possible to observe from (5.2)), the inequality is satisfied if
the second term is sufficiently small. Consequently, the problem of moral hazard may appear also
when BRC >a ! See Footnote 6 for a numeric example.
7 Maybe surprisingly, the moral hazard
problem is avoided if the initial value of collateral is very high.
Remark 1. If the initial amount of collateral is very high, for example a/rC =  , the non-
monitoring strategy is unprofitable and the moral hazard problem is eliminated.
To see this, suppose first that BRC <a and let a/rC = . Inserting a/rC =  into (5.9) shows that
a must be smaller than 1, which is not possible.  Suppose now that BRC >a  and a/rC = . It is
easy to see that constraint (5.13) is not satisfied because .0<-- GBB rY pm
 8
Consequently, the bank regulator can eliminate moral hazard either by denying the use
of collateral, 0=C , or by imposing very high collateral requirement for banks, a/rC = . Only
7 Suppose that ,25.1,01.0,03.1,05.1,1 ===== BGG YmrYm 8.0,6.0,4.1,,8.0 2
1 ===== ChB aam . Under
these values, 047.1,04.1 == BG RR . When the collateral value appreciates, it exceeds the loan repayment since
=4.1*8.0 047.112.1 > . As a result the bank receives the loan repayment 047.1  when the collateral value appreciates.
Since 03.1047.1 > , the bank makes a profit. Thus, the bank optimally neglects monitoring. When the collateral value
depreciates, the total income of the bank, 93.0 , does not cover payments on deposits, 03.1 , and the bank fails.
8 This explains why we have excluded [ ]BB RCMaxh --- am ,0)1)(1(  from (5.4) .  When BRC >a , it is known that
rC >a  and the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable.
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when the amount of collateral is at the intermediate level, can the problem of moral hazard appear.
Intuitively, gambling with collateral is possible only when the initial amount of collateral is at the
intermediate level. If the initial amount of collateral is low, 0=C , there is nothing to gamble with.
If the initial amount of collateral is very high, a/rC = , the collateral value is so high that a
defaulted loan yields at least rC =a , which covers interest on deposits. Thus, the loan is (almost)
risk-free; there is no gamble. Furthermore, when the initial amount of collateral is very high,
entrepreneurs are ready to borrow only if the loan interest rate is lower than r . Then the bank goes
into bankruptcy with certainty.
Remark 1, however, underestimates gambling with collateral, since collateral consists
entirely of outside collateral. When inside collateral is used, the problem of moral hazard may
appear even when the initial amount of collateral is very high. This is explored in section 7.
5.3 Discussion
Diamond (1984) advances a seminal vision on banking. A bank operates as a delegated monitor and
financial intermediary. This task generates the moral hazard problem between the bank and its
depositors. Will the bank exert effort in monitoring? In Diamond’s model, the problem disappears
since the number of borrowers is huge and the risks and returns of their projects are independent.
Thanks to the law of large numbers, the loan portfolio is perfectly diversified and its return is
certain. Therefore, depositors can rely on the bank being safe.
The initial part of this section follows the vision of Diamond (1984). Thanks to the
law of large numbers, the share of successful loans is certain. Thus, without collateral the bank is
motivated to monitor borrowers and is risk-free. Thereafter, collateral is introduced. Given the
findings of Section 4, it may appear that the bank regulator can be relieved. Two tools, monitoring
and collateral, are simultaneously utilized to eliminate moral hazard even through one tool is
sufficient. Unfortunately, the appearance is faulty. The introduction of collateral may fuel moral
hazard.
Intuitively, without collateral the bank cannot to seek a correlated risk for its loan
portfolio. The loan portfolio is perfectly diversified, which eliminates moral hazard. The
introduction of collateral changes the state of affairs, since the value of each borrower’s collateral is
the same: low or high. Collateral offers a correlated risk to gamble with. It is rather insignificant to
the bank whether or not a borrower is able to earn income and thereby repay his loan. Crucial is the
collateral value; if it is high, the bank makes a handsome profit, but if it is low, it fails.
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There is abundant evidence to suggest that lending decisions are often based on
collateral. As to the Savings and Loan Crisis in U.S.A, Freund & Curry & Hirch & Kelly (1998, p.
155) document:
“Traditionally, decisions to extend loans that are collateralized by commercial real estate property are evaluated
by lenders primarily on the borrowers’ ability to generate earnings from the investment sufficient to cover the
existing debt payments. This is a fundamental tenet of the lending function. As a backup source of security,
lenders evaluate the worth of investment property as potential collateral to cover the loan value in the case of
default by the borrower. Starting in the late 1970s and continuing for the most of the following decade,
examiners observed that lenders loosened loan terms relating to debt-service coverage and placed relatively more
emphasis on the value of the collateral in making funding decisions. This change in loan procedures was based
primarily on the assumption that real estate values (collateral values) would continue to rise in the future as they
had in the recent past. …. When the real estate markets collapsed starting in the late 1980s, many lenders
discovered that collateral values were often insufficient to cover existing loan losses”.
The banking crisis in Japan was preceded by similar lending policy. Herring & Wachter (1999, p.40)
report: “Some banks apparently tended to rely on the rising value of land rather than rigorous credit
analysis in underwriting loans.” Hilberts & Lei & Zacho (2001, p. 14) underline that before the
banking crises in Finland and Sweden “lending decisions relied primary on availability of collateral
rather than cash flow evaluations.” As regards to the Asian crisis, Collyns and Senhadji (2005, p.
112) note: “Typically, techniques for credit assessment by banks were weakly developed, and banks
tended to rely heavily on property collateral (and, to some extent, equity collateral) in making loan
decisions.” Consequently, evidence supports the view that many banks neglect monitoring and
gamble with the collateral value.
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6. Uncertain loan losses, uncertain collateral
Recall that collateral incurs costs to a bank, since a borrower is ready to pledge collateral only if in
this way he can cut the loan interest rate. On the other hand, the bank benefits from collateral
through unsuccessful loans: when a loan defaults, the bank can seize collateral. The introduction of
collateral is profitable to a non-monitoring bank if the second effect dominates. As Section 5 reveals,
the second effect dominates if the collateral value fluctuates widely. This section extends the
analysis by showing that the second effect may also be prevalent if the upcoming value of collateral
is strongly correlated with the upcoming probability of project success. When the collateral value is
high, the probability of success is also high and vice versa. Since a thorough examination is
complex, the analysis has been shortened considerably. Banking under monitoring, for example, is
simplified.
As above, under monitoring (in the absence of monitoring ) the upcoming share of
successful loans in the loan portfolio is either small, Gn ( Bn ), or  large, Gn ( Bn ), and has an
expected value Gm  ( Bm ). In addition, the initial amount of collateral is C  . Its upcoming value is
uncertain and it is either high, Ca (with probability h ), or low, Ca  (with probability h-1 ) .  For
simplification, suppose that 1== GG nn . Under monitoring, loans always succeed and banks are
risk-free. The loan interest rate is rmRG +=  and banks earn zero returns. If the expected profits
from the non-monitoring strategy are positive, banks optimally neglect monitoring.
In the absence of monitoring, the loan interest rate is such that an entrepreneur is
ready to select the bad project. His expected profits are at least the same as from the good project
( ) [ ] ( )
( ) [ ] ( )
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               (6.1)
The L.H.S gives the borrower’s profits in four states of the world: high collateral value and large
share of successful loans, high collateral value and small share of successful loans, low collateral
value and large share of successful loans as well as low collateral value and small share of
successful loans. Here ( )aBnP   ( ( )aBnP   ) denotes the probability that the share of successful
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loans is large (small) when the collateral value is high. In addition, ( )aBnP   ( ( )aBnP  )
represents the probability, that the share of successful loans is large (small) when the collateral
value is low.  Obviously, it is known that )(1)( aa nPnP -= and )(1)( aa nPnP -= . The
expected probability of success can now be expressed by summing the expected probabilities of
success in the four state of the world
BBBBBBBBB nnPhnnPhnnhPnnPh )()1()()1()()( aaaam -+-++= . (6.2)
Using (6.2), )(1)( aa nPnP -= and )(1)( aa nPnP -= , the loan interest, (6.1), can be restated as
[ ]
B
BBBBBBGBB
B
nnnPhCCnnY
R
m
aaamapm ))()(()(1 --+-----
= . (6.3)
Here (6.3) reveals that the highest loan interest acceptable to borrowers is maximized when )( anP
is as large as possible. Given )(1)( aa nPnP -=  , )( anP  is then as small as possible. Using (6.2),
)(1)( aa nPnP -= and )(1)( aa nPnP -= it is possible to show that when )( anP  is maximized,
)( anP is minimal. Since )(1)( aa nPnP -=  and since )( anP is minimized, )( anP  is maximal.
Hence, the loan interest rate is as high as possible when the upcoming share of successful loans
(that is, the upcoming probability that a loan succeeds) is closely correlated with the upcoming
value of collateral. Intuitively, given the borrower’s participation constraint, collateral cuts the
highest loan interest rate that is acceptable to borrowers. This represents the cost of the collateral to
the bank. The more severe the borrower’s risk to collateral loss, the larger the required cut in the
loan interest rate. When the upcoming collateral value is closely correlated with the upcoming share
of successful loans, the costs of collateral are minimized. More specifically, when the value of
collateral is high, the probability that a project fails is minimal. It is unlikely that the borrower loses
valuable collateral. On the contrary, when the borrower’s project is likely to fail, the collateral value
is low. Therefore, even if the borrower loses the collateral, his losses are minor. Thus, the expected
costs of collateral are relatively insignificant to the borrower and he is ready to pledge the collateral
if the loan interest rate declines slightly. This is, of course, profitable for the banks.
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Since the problem is complex, we analyze it with a numeric example. Suppose that
,85.0,55.0,7.0 === BBB nnm 5.0,2,0 === haa , ,95.0=Gm ,04.1=r
,01.0=m 2.1,11.1 == BG YY , 4.0,5.0 == Cb . The values provide 0045.0=Gp .  In this
economy, the following inequalities are satisfied
rCCR BBB <-+ amm )1()( , rCnCRn BBB <-+ )1()( . (6.4)
The first inequality states that the bank fails when the share of successful loans is at the expected
level, Bm , even when the value of collateral is high. That is, the variation in collateral value alone is
not sufficient to generate the problem of moral hazard. The second assumption states that the bank
fails when the share of successful loans peaks, but the value of collateral is at the expected, average
level. Thus, the variation in the share of successful loans alone is not sufficient to cause the moral
hazard problem.
 First, the probability of success and the collateral value are independent: 21)( =anP .
Given (6.3) the loan interest rate is 1.022, which is less than the interest on deposits. Banking is
unprofitable. Second, the probability of success and the collateral value are completely correlated:
1)( =anP . Given (6.3), the loan interest rate is 1.108, which exceeds the interest on deposits. Thus,
banking may be profitable. Given (6.4), if the bank can make a profit, it does so when a large
probability of success coincides with the high value of collateral. Thus, bank returns amount to
[ ]rCnRnMaxnPh BBB --+ aa )1(,0)( . Inserting the loan interest rate from (6.3) to this
provides rewritten bank returns
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It is easy to see that bank returns are increasing in )( aBnP . Under the circumstances of the
economy, the returns can be expressed as
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The bank returns are positive only if )( anP  and C  are sufficiently large. When the share of
successful loans and the value of collateral are independent, 21)( =anP , the bank fails. When they
are completely correlated, 1)( =anP ,  and when the amount of collateral is sufficiently large, e.g .
4.0=C  , banking is profitable without monitoring. Thus, the bank optimally neglects monitoring.
It is important to note from (6.4) that the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable
without collateral. In addition, (6.4) states that the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable if the
collateral value fluctuates, but the share of successful loans is certain. This case (uncertain collateral,
certain loan losses) is identical as that described in Section 4, but now the moral hazard problem is
now avoided. Only if the share of successful loans also fluctuates, banking may be profitable
without monitoring and the problem of moral hazard appears. Consequently, the moral hazard effect
of uncertain collateral is strengthened by the uncertain share of successful loans. Furthermore, the
larger the correlation between the collateral value and the share of successful loans, the more likely
it is that the moral hazard problem appears.
Proposition 3. When the volatility of collateral value alone is insufficient to generate moral
hazard, the problem of moral hazard may occur if the upcoming share of successful loans also
fluctuates. That is, the probability that the collateral value is high simultaneously with the large
share of successful loans is sufficiently great.
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7. Inside collateral
Let us again repeat the two effects of collateral.
i.) When the initial amount of collateral, C,  raises, the loan interest rate has to decline due
to the borrowers’ participation constraint
ii.) Unsuccessful loans yield collateral income to banks.
Collateral fuels moral hazard only when the second effect dominates. Section 5 shows that the
second effect may dominate when the collateral value fluctuates widely. The first effect – the
decline of the loan interest rate – is small, if the initial amount of collateral is not too high. The
second effect is strong if the upcoming value of collateral can be high. Section 6 demonstrates that
the second effect dominates if the probability of loan success and the collateral value are closely
correlated. Then, the first effect is small since the expected loses of the borrower are minimal. The
second effect is strong if the upcoming value of collateral can be high.9 Finally, this section shows
that the second effect dominates if collateral consists of inside collateral, which is funded with the
loan capital. Since the collateral incurs no costs to borrowers, the first effect is removed and the
second effect dominates the first effect.
To model this, the framework is updated. Since an entrepreneur has no capital of his
own, he needs to seek for a bank loan. The loan size is 1 unit and is used to purchase assets, which
are pledged as collateral, 1=C  unit. The bank size is 1 and it has no capital of its own. The bank
funds its loans by attracting deposits at the interest rate of the economy, r .
The entrepreneur can choose from two project types: a good project or a bad project.
When successful, the good project produces GY  units. Its expected probability of success is fixed,
Gm  . The bad project succeeds with probability Bm  producing BY  units, BGGB YY mm >> , .When
unsuccessful, the value of both projects is either Ca   or Ca  depending on that whether the value of
collateral appreciates (with probability h ) or depreciates (with probability h-1 ) during the project.
As before, the expected NPV of the good project is assumed to be clearly positive
mrCY GGG +>-+ )1( mm , (7.1)
whereas the expected NPV of the bad project is negative
9 Recall that in Sections 5 and 6, collateral is outside collateral. Outside collateral refers to the case where a borrowing
entrepreneur pledges assets not used in the project.
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rCY BBB <-+ )1( mm . (7.2)
Without monitoring, the risk-shifting problem is assumed to appear. The borrower
chooses the bad project since it yields higher expected profits for him
[ ] [ ]rCMaxhrYrChMaxrY BBBGGG --+-<--+- ammamm ,0)1()(,0)1()( . (7.3)
Note that the borrower cannot lose collateral, since it is purchased with the loan capital. On the
contrary, if the collateral value appreciates during the loan period, it exceeds the loan repayment,
rC >a  , and the borrower receives the surplus, rC -a , even if his project has failed. If a bank
monitors (neglects monitoring), a certain share of its loans, Gm ( Bm ) is successful. For simplicity, it
is assumed that a monitoring bank never fails. That is, 1=== GGG nn m . As a result, rmRG +=
and the expected profits from the good project are rmYGG --=p .
The bank neglects monitoring if it is profitable. This is possible only if the bank earns
profits when the collateral value is high
[ ] rCRMinR BBBB >-+ amm ,)1( , (7.4)
where BR    is solved from the borrowers’ participation constraint. The loan interest rate, BR , needs
to be such that the borrowers obtain the same expected profits as by choosing the good project
GBBBBB RCMaxhRY pamm ³--+- ),0()1()( . (7.5)
Inserting BR  from (7.5) into (7.4) gives two scenarios. First, when BR<a  (recall 1=C ) the non-
monitoring strategy is profitable if
0))(1()( >--+-- rCrY BGBB ampm , (7.6)
We show below in a numeric example that the inequality may be satisfied. Second, when BR>a ,
the non-monitoring strategy is profitable if rRB > . Given (7.5), this means that
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.0)()1()( >--+-- rChrY BGBB ampm (7.7)
Given (7.3), this is true. Recall from (5.8) that with outside equity moral hazard appears when
[ ] 0)1()1()( >---+-- rCrY BGBB ampm .
The L.H.S is smaller than in (7.6); the moral hazard problem is more severe with inside collateral.
Even when the problem of moral hazard is avoided with outside collateral, it may appear with
inside collateral. The intuition is obvious. With outside collateral, the borrower faces a risk of losing
his own wealth, whereas with inside collateral the borrower cannot lose anything since he has not
invested his own wealth in the project. The whole project is funded with the loan capital.10
The required rise of the collateral value can be small. Suppose an economic
environment: 97.0,03.1,,6.0,07.1,01.0,03.1,055.1 21 ======== aam hYmrY BBG . Under
these economic circumstances, 045.1=BR . Because 045.103.1 < , the appreciated value of
collateral does not cover the loan repayment and a borrower receives income only if the project
succeeds. Since +045.1*4.0 036.103.1*6.0 = , the bank’s income covers payments on deposits
03.1  when the collateral value appreciates. Therefore, the bank is profitable if the collateral value
appreciates even when the share of successful loans is small, 40%, and the rise of the collateral
value is modest, 3%. The problem of moral hazard appears.
Proposition 4.  The moral hazard problem is less severe with outside collateral than with inside
collateral (when the whole project is financed with the loan capital).
This section can be interpreted as follows. A borrower purchases a house, which is pledged as
collateral. If the borrower can earn income, he can repay the loan and keep the house. If he cannot
earn income, the bank seizes the collateral. However, since the value of the house can appreciate
10 Note from (7.6) and (7.7) that the larger the reservation utility of the borrower, Gp , the lower the loan interest rate is.
Hence, if there are loan applicants with different reservation utilities, a bank, which is gambling with the collateral
value, may optimally choose “bad loan applicants” with a low reservation utility because these are ready to pay high
interest on loans.
25
during the loan period, it is possible that its value exceeds the loan repayment. Then, the borrower
can keep the surplus. The borrower decides whether to work hard (choose a good project) or shirk
effort (choose a bad project). Again, the bank is gambling with collateral. If the value of the house
appreciates sufficiently, rRC B >>a , the bank does not bear loan losses even when it does not
monitor its borrowers. If the property value depreciates, a large share of borrowers cannot repay
their loans and the bank fails.
8. Conclusion
This paper has explored how collateral affects bank risk. We have seen that if the collateral value is
certain, the introduction of collateral alleviates the volatility of bank returns, thereby making banks
more safe and mitigating moral hazard. If the value of collateral fluctuates, the introduction of
collateral may generate a moral hazard problem. This negative effect of collateral may deepen if the
value of collateral is strongly correlated with the project’s probability to success. The negative
effect is also deepened if collateral consists of inside collateral, which is financed with the loan
capital.
We do not insist that collateral is the main cause of the recent banking crises.
However, we argue that in some cases, for example in the subprime mortgage crisis and in
emerging economies, collateral may have played a crucial role. Subprime mortgage lending satisfies
the conditions that induce moral hazard:  collateral value fluctuates strongly, it is correlated with the
probability to earn income and collateral consists mostly of inside collateral, which is funded with
the loan capital.11 Furthermore, the borrowers of subprime banks are risky clients willing to pay
high interest on loans. Thus, it is likely that the problem of moral hazard appears. A few subprime
banks relying on the rising value of real estate have granted loans to loan applicants without
attempts at borrower evaluation.
11 In many cases, a loan-to-value ratio is over 90% (Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 2006).
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Appendix A
Appendix A solves the variance of the collateral value as a function of a .
Using the definition of variance, [ ]222 )()()( XEXEX -=s , the variance of the collateral value can
be expressed as
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It is easy to see that the variance is increasing in a , since 1>a  Q.E.D
Appendix B
This Appendix shows that the term in the second set of brackets of (5.12) is zero. To see this, note
that +BB Rm rCB -- am )1(  can be rewritten as )()1( BBGBB RChrY --+-- ampm . This is
negative at least when BRC <a . To see that BRC <a , we express (5.10) as follows
rYrRRCh GBBBBB --=-+--- pmam )())(1)(1( . (B.1)
The R.H.S is negative. There are two terms on the L.H.S. The latter is positive, when the non-
monitoring strategy is profitable. If BRC >a , the first term on the L.H.S is also positive. But then
the L.H.S is positive and the R.H.S is negative, which is not possible. Thus, it is known that
BRC <a  and the term in the second brackets of (5.12) is equal to zero; the bank fails when the
collateral value depreciates. Q.E.D
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